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   The purpose of this research paper was to ask the question:  Is there an 
effective and efficient process whereby local law enforcement agencies of varying 
sizes can use their finite resources to accurately identify, prevent, detect, deter, 
disrupt or minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack or activity within their 
jurisdictions?  This paper hypothesizes several issues. There is a way for law 
enforcement agencies to proactively identify potential terrorist threats and/or 
activities occurring in their areas, prior to a terrorist attack actually taking place.  
There is a simple system to identify potential terrorist targets and that proactive 
anti-terrorism efforts can be made using the existing resources of law 
enforcement agencies with minimal additional investigative training and cost. The 
research done for this project supported the hypothesis.     
Anti-terrorism is a defensive or proactive effort to try and prevent a terrorist 
attack.  The Terroris  Group P ofiling of a terrorist organization and The 12 
Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism were the result of studying over 1000 
documented cases of terrorist attacks worldwide.   The 12 Evolutionary Steps of 
Terrorism organized and placed in chronological order, the 12 behaviors that 
most terrorist groups go through when planning a terrorist attack and an 
associated timeline for those behaviors.  Understanding those behaviors and 
what motivates groups will help law enforcement to identify potential terrorist 
activity and address it appropriately.   That effort can be enhanced by combining 
information gathered with open source intelligence, criminal and suspicious 
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 Since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
ensuing anthrax mail attacks, there has been a community and societal concern 
for what government agencies are doing to address and combat terrorism locally.  
Fire departments and law enforcement agencies are applying for grant funds and 
re-writing budgets to funnel money into hazardous material response 
preparations and bomb detections devices.  Government building managers, 
various organizations and corporate America are hiring security consultants at a 
record pace to fortify and strengthen facilities, block access to roads and install 
metal detectors.  Airport security has evolved into an adventure that rivals most 
SWAT operations.  Airline pilots are carrying guns.  Ironically the use of those 
weapons requires them to open a secured bulkhead door to shoot in the direction 
of passengers, in an effort to protect the traveling public.  In all this excitement, it 
seems that federal agencies are getting larger and reorganized while local 
agencies are getting grant funds cut and pats on the back from state and federal 
agencies who say they will respond to assist with any terrorist incident that might 
occur in their city, as soon as the request is processed through proper channels.  
Narcotics task force budgets are being cut and every letter a person receives in 
the mail from one of those magazine clearing houses, has a white powder 
substance in it that must be anthrax.  After all, they live in a trailer park and are 
two months behind on their rent.  It isn’t that they live in a trailer park. It’s why 
would they be a target? Why isn’t anyone promoting some way of preventing a 
terrorist attack rather than responding to it?  It would seem that having your 
hazardous materials response team capable of responding to a 
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chemical/biological event in your city would be a great idea until you realize that 
all you’re doing is moving the rescued from your contaminated zone into the 
government’s contaminated zone because the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
assisted, by federal, state and distant local agencies, has setup a no in or out 
perimeter 10 miles outside your city limits and is waiting and watching from the 
outside trying to determine what can best be done to help those outside the 
perimeter.  Although this scenario is hypothetical, or is it, there has to be a better 
way.  This research paper will look to answer the question; is there a proven 
method for law enforcement agencies of varying sizes to use existing 
investigative resources to prevent terrorism in their jurisdiction without having to 
apply for a grant to purchase a pancakeometer, whatever that is.  Terrorism 
involves human behavior, and all behavior is purposeful and pleasure seeking.  
The advancements in the study of human behavior and the study of terrorist 
groups has to have crossed paths, even if in another country that has been 
dealing with terrorism as a way of life for some time.  Most people are aware of 
the homicide/suicide bomber attacks the Israeli Government deals with.  What 
most people aren’t aware of is they have estimated they prevent 90% of the 
attacks planned by terrorist groups against Israeli interests.  There has to be a 
system that will enhance community and societal concerns and provide local law 
enforcement agencies some form of investigative ability that is credible enough to 
consider a viable option to prevent terrorism.   
 The research for this paper began by outlining basic terrorism concerns 
and individuals who have expertise in those fields.  Interviews were done, 
information gathered, analyses completed, comparisons made and conclusions 
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drawn that either proved or disprove the hypothesis which is: there is a way law 
enforcement agencies can proactively identify potential terrorist threats and/or 
activities occurring in their areas, prior to a terrorist attack actually taking place, 
better identify potential terrorist targets located within their jurisdictions and that 
proactive anti-terrorism efforts can be done using the existing investigative 
resources of law enforcement agencies with minimal additional investigative 
training and cost.  The intent of the research was to provide at least an outline 
that law enforcement agencies can use to consider as a method of addressing 
terrorism concerns.     
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
While preparing this report, it was important to find corroborating data to 
support the hypothesis.  There were seven books from which information was 
gathered, and all seven supported issues identified in a study performed by Mr. 
Hart Brown and Mr. Doug Smith.  Their conclusions were the Terrorist Group 
Profiling system and The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism.   
In the book A Force upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and 
the Poli ics of Hate, Kenneth Stern discusses an historical account of the militia 
movement in America.  The book was released after the bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City when the patriot and militia movements were 
escalating as a domestic terrorism concern.  Stern reveals a growing feeling of 
mistrust of the Government among militia groups and discusses the most 
extreme of these anti-government groups “Patriots”.   
t
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In the book American Jihad: The Terroris  Living Among Us, the author, 
Steven Emerson, discusses the Islamic movement within the United States and 
how those groups are tied to known terrorist groups such as Hamas and 
Hizaballah.  Emerson discusses how terrorist networks are working across 
America to fund raise, recruit and hide terrorist activities in America.  Emerson 
himself has been targeted by terrorist groups and has been offered enrollment 
into the witness protection program because his research has been so damaging 
to terrorist organizations.  
t
Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror by Rohan Gunaratna is based 
on over five years of research and interviews dealing with the structure, ideology, 
motivations, and tactics of this very violent terrorist group.  One thing identified in 
this book is Al Qaeda’s ability to learn from mistakes made during their 
operations as well as the mistakes of other terrorist organizations thereby 
improving their tactics and strategies.   
Inside Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman reviews the history of terrorism and 
provides a historical overview. Hoffman is the director of the Centre for the Study 
of Terrorism and Political Violence.  The book reviews the motivations of religious 
terrorist groups and supports several of the issues identified in this project’s 
research into group profiles and motivations.  
Target USA: The Inside Story of the New Terrorist War by Louis R. Mizell 
Jr. is another book that provides an overview of terrorism.  A passage from the 
book states “An enemy with a thousand faces has declared war on the United 
States, and the fighting has already commenced. The battlefields are neither 
deserts nor tropical jungles, but office buildings, hotels, churches, airports, and 
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even quiet suburban streets. The enemy soldiers, rarely in uniform, are virtually 
invisible.”  It discusses many terrorist events and activities that have been going 
on around the United States for years.   
Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why by Rex A. Hudson and the staff of the 
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, is probably the most 
complete reference material reviewed which supports the research for this 
project.  It reviews many terrorist groups and provides profiles of terrorist 
activities using non-classified open sources of intelligence.  This report was 
considered a landmark research study in the field of terrorism.   
The Cobra Event by Richard Preston is the book read by President Clinton 
that was credited with focusing Clinton’s attention on America’s domestic 
preparedness against Terrorism.  The book takes an Ebola type virus and builds 
a storyline around it as a possible bio-terrorist weapon.  The story is fictional but 
uses agents and organisms that are actually available, discusses how the agent 
could be disseminated, who could be capable of such an attack, and who would 
investigate or be brought to bear.   
The Government Accounting Office Report (GAO/NASIAD 98-74) states in 
part, “Threat and risk assessments are widely recognized as valid decision 
support tool to establish and prioritize security program requirements.  A threat 
analysis, the first step in determining risk, identifies and evaluates each threat on 
the basis of various factors, such as, it’s capability and intent to attack an asset, 
the likelihood of a successful attack, and its lethality.  Generally, the risk 
assessment process is a deliberate, analytical approach to identify which threats 
can exploit which vulnerabilities in organizations specific assets”.  This document 
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supports the need for threat and risk assessments, and the organization of 
intelligence to assist in decision making and threat management.  
The Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin 03-004 
(Possible Indicators o  Al-Qaeda Surveillance) dated March 20, 2003, outlines 
identified behaviors of Al Qaeda operatives who are conducting surveillance 
within the United States.  The document is important because close review and 
consideration of the behaviors indicated are proof that if a law enforcement or 
government organization were going to focus their efforts on identifying terrorist 
surveillance or reconnaissance activities in their area, the agency would need to 
concentrate on the behavior  exhibited not necessarily the race, religion or 
ethnicity of the individual.  According to Smith, the surveillance indicators listed in 
this document are mirrored by class participants while conducting vulnerability 
surveys as part of their class security surveys section of training. This reinforces 




The L.E.A.R.N. Practical Anti-Terrorism Training for Regulators of the 
Food and Agricul ure Industry – A Common sense Approach is a training manual 
developed and furnished to class participants, in the USDA’s Anti-terrorism 
training program.  It outlines terrorist group behaviors, profiles, motivations, 
chemical and biological weapons, threat and vulnerability surveys, security 
objectives, open source intelligence gathering, protective intelligence, information 
management, social engineering, multidisciplinary teams, S.C.A.N. and threat 
management.  These topics all support the hypothesis and even outline the 
process for which law enforcement agencies can identify and implement training 
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that would allow existing investigative and enforcement resources to be used in a 
proactive manner against possible terrorist activities in their jurisdictions. There is 
also a facilitators training manual that addresses train the trainer courses 




 The purpose of this research paper was to answer the question:  Is there a 
proven effective and efficient process whereby local law enforcement agencies of 
varying sizes can use their finite resources to accurately, identify, prevent, detect, 
deter, disrupt or minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack or activity within their 
jurisdictions?  The intent of this research paper was to develop information to 
support the hypothesis that there is a way and means for law enforcement 
agencies to proactively identify potential terrorist threats and/or activities 
occurring in their areas, prior to a terrorist attack actually taking place, a way to 
identify potential terrorist targets located within their jurisdictions and that 
proactive anti-terrorism efforts can be done using the existing investigative 
resources of law enforcement agencies with minimal additional investigative 
training and cost.  The method of inquiry for the research in this project was to 
identify information available regarding the hypothesized program and to develop 
research data to defend, support or disprove the hypothesis.  This was 
accomplished through personal interviews with subject matter experts.  The data 
gathered was then reviewed and compared with data from other subject matter 
experts, published materials and open sources of intelligence.  The individuals 
who participated in this project had expertise in differing fields including anti-
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terrorism, counter-terrorism, special operations medicine, military and civilian 
special operations such as S.W.A.T., hostage rescue and dignitary protection.  
They also had experience with the development of multidisciplinary teams, 
computer crime investigations, public and private sector training, radiological 
health engineering, systems safety engineering, safety engineering with focus on 
hazardous materials, explosions and their application to emergency responses.  
There was also expertise in industrial firefighting, oil spill cleanup, hazardous 
waste site management, emergency responses to terrorism, industrial rescue, 
threat management and emergency responses to chemical/biological terrorist 
incidents, incident command and white collar crime.  The experts all had 
experience in course and curriculum design, instructor certifications and peace 
officer certifications.  Some had developed programs and models for addressing 
terrorism that have been used and trained worldwide.  The research would 
hopefully identify what law enforcement agencies can do to take a proactive role 
in their jurisdictions to address terrorism concerns without a tremendous increase 




 For this project, it was necessary to conduct research on terrorism 
by identifying and analyzing terrorist group motivations and profiles, and to 
review that information to develop an understanding of the methods terrorists use 
to successfully plan and carry out terrorist acts.  It was also important to 
recognize that a terrorist attack could be either an act of domestic terrorism, as in 
the case of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City or an 
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act of international terrorism as was the case with the two attacks on the World 
Trade Center.  When researching the modern day approach to dealing with 
terrorism, it is important to identify that the term counter-terrorism is generally an 
offensive or reactive approach to dealing with terrorism after an attack has 
occurred.  An example of this would be our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan against 
Al-Qaeda.  Anti-terrorism is a defensive or proactive effort to try and prevent a 
terrorist attack.  Counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism can both have the same 
final outcome which is to identify, locate and neutralize the threat.  The 
identifiable difference for this project is that anti-terrorism, the focus of this paper, 
is a more practical and realistic approach for the majority of law enforcement 
agencies.  
The first subject matter expert interviewed was Doug H. Smith a 27 year 
veteran of law enforcement with past military and special operations experience.  
Smith earned a B.S. in Criminal Justice and has been involved in basic and 
advanced level training for both public and private agencies for over 20 years.  
Interviews with Smith revealed the first indicators that the hypothesis could be 
supported.  In 1988 Smith was approached by the Travis County Adult Probation 
Office in Austin, Texas.  The agency’s concern was that they were dealing with a 
more violent cliental and had concerns for their safety.  They requested the 
development of a defensive tactics training program to better prepare probation 
officers to deal with or react to violent confrontations with probationers.  Smith 
and his multidisciplinary project team identified that rather than teach the officers 
what to do when attacked it was a better approach to identify how to prevent the 
attack.  The team believed that a Safety and Security Needs Assessment would 
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be a more practical approach than defensive tactics training.  Defensive tactics 
training would require an assault to take place before action could be taken; but 
preventing the attack all together seemed a more practical and reasonable 
approach.  The team used a three step approach.  They developed a customized 
questionnaire for all the employees and developed a customized check list then 
photographed and videotaped each facility to evaluate each facility’s 
vulnerabilities.  They also conducted individual and group interviews about 
specific security issues with over 165 employees in 7 facilities.  The surveys and 
interviews were designed to identify what the employees perceptions were 
regarding the problem and, what they were willing to tolerate in order to make 
needed changes.   Using that information, the team reviewed the findings and 
provided a report that cataloged and prioritized problems.  The report addressed 
facility vulnerabilities, procedures, staff capabilities and administrative oversight.  
The report revealed that 85% of the problems identified had nothing to do with a 
need for defensive tactics training.  What was needed was to modify the facilities 
and attached environment and to modify processes and procedures used by 
employees to match or manage the threat.  The training program developed from 
that report was successfully implemented in other adult probation offices in San 
Antonio and Dallas.  An interesting note was that none of the steps taken to 
resolve the problem were new.  What was new was incorporating them together 
into a multidimensional Safety and Security Needs Assessment.  What was also 
interesting was that by taking a proactive approach and managing the problem at 
an earlier stage, they had longer periods of time to recognize and deal with the 
threat.  In a sense, the solution was simply organizing with common sense.   
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There is a correlation between that project and this research.  A defensive 
or offensive approach could have been used as is the case with counter-terrorism 
vs. anti-terrorism.  In that case, an offensive approach would have only 
addressed 15% of the problem identified, and it required an employee be 
vulnerable to an attack before the solution could be used.  A defensive approach 
was the better choice because it prevented the attack rather than waiting for the 
attack to take place and then reacting to it.  This is a part of the foundation for the 
hypothesis.  
Ten years later, in 1998, Smith was the project manager at a state law 
enforcement training academy when he and his team were approached by the 
United States Department of Justice (DoJ) to design a National Threat 
Assessment Program to address domestic preparedness in America.  It was 
interesting to discover that according to the book Germs: Biological Weapons and 
Americas Secret War by Judith Miller, around 1995, President Clinton read a 
book by Richard Preston called The Cobra Event.  After reading that book, 
Clinton went to members of his National Security Council and asked how 
prepared the United States was to deal with a terrorist event like the one 
described in the book.   The President was told that America wasn’t very 
prepared, and Clinton began a shift of government attention and concentration on 
domestic preparedness for terrorism in America.  He initiated that effort placing 
the Department of Defense (DoD) in charge of domestic preparedness.   By 
1998, the DoD was receiving much criticism as its’ efforts were waning.  The 
President tasked the Department of Justice with domestic preparedness.  A 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) report GAO/NASIAD 98-74 stated that 
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threat and vulnerability assessments were valuable problem solving tools but the 
conventional wisdom of other subject matter experts was that these assessments 
to preventing terrorism would be too complicated, would require a staff of experts 
and would cost too much money.   
In June of 1998, Congress requested that the DoJ take the lead on the 
domestic preparedness project.  Smith’s team was asked to submit a proposal for 
the development of a National Threat Assessment Program to address the issues 
of preparedness for terrorism but it had to be cost effective and simple to operate.  
Remembering the success of the adult probation project and how they used a 
multidimensional approach to develop that strategy, Smith’s team applied the 
same fundamentals to the new DoJ project.  Smith asked one of his team 
members to provide developmental and detailed analytical support.  Hart Brown 
had a B.S. in Radiological Health Engineering with a certification as a Systems 
Safety Engineering Specialist.  Brown also had a M.S. in Safety Engineering with 
focus in the areas of hazardous materials, explosions and their pertinence to 
emergency responses.   
The first thing the team needed was to create a questionnaire.  Brown 
developed a 52 item questionnaire to be completed by DoJ class participants, 
prior to attending the class, to identify their level of experience and perceptions 
about terrorism.  The team understood that if they were to change a person’s 
perception, you must first understand what their perception was.   
The second thing Smith’s team did was to develop a site survey form used 
to help students evaluate and rate the level of security and vulnerability at a 
facility.  Smith’s team then trained students to use a multidisciplinary team 
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approach to complete those surveys and identify ways to manage threats.  It was 
discovered that by using these survey forms and the multidisciplinary team 
approach, the class was more effective at identifying security and vulnerability 
concerns than was the trained security team Smith had used to do surveys on the 
same sites prior to sending out the class.  A deficiency identified was that the 
class participants didn’t know how to use existing resources to address those 
concerns.  That became one of the training issues concentrated on by the team.     
As Smith’s team organized the project for DoJ, Brown continued his 
research on terrorist organizations and how they planned and carried out attacks.  
There were two very interesting research conclusions.  The Terrorist Group 
Profiling of a terrorist organization and The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism.  
Brown studied over 1000 documented cases of terrorist attacks worldwide.  While 
analyzing these events, a pattern of consistent behaviors emerged in the vast 
majority which allowed Brown to create an algorithm for pattern analysis.  One of 
the patterns that developed from this analysis was Terrorist G oup Profiling.  
Brown identified that a terrorist group can be profiled by considering four areas: 
Location, Motivation, Financial Backing and Education.  The first two, location 
and motivation, helped determine potential targets.  The last two, financial 
backing and level of education, helped determine potential capability.     
r
 Location considerations were simple.  Where are the terrorists operating?  
Brown had identified 12 behaviors called The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism.  
He organized and placed in chronological order, 12 behaviors that most terrorist 
groups go through when planning a terrorist attack.  His ability to attach a timeline 
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to those behaviors was enlightening.  Brown identified that it took most terrorist 
groups 16 to 24 months to complete the first 9 behaviors which were:  
o Create a Group and Recruit Group Members 
o Fundraise 
o Select a Weapon, took 12 to 18 months 
 
o Select a Target 
o Select a Date 
o Conduct Surveillance or Reconnaissance, took 4 to 6 more months 
 
o Move the Weapon to the Target 
o Egress from the Target (if desired) 
o Activate the Weapon took less than 1 hour. 
What was even more enlightening, was that all of these behaviors 
occurred within 30, 60 or in limited cases 90 to 120 miles from the final target 
location.  Brown discovered that after Weapon Activation, the next 3 behaviors 
were for the group to Gain Media Attention, Claim Responsibility and to try to 
Reduce Public Support of the Government which increased recruiting and 
support for their cause.   
 The next area of consideration in group profiling was group motivation.  
Understanding what motivates groups would help a team to identify potential 
targets if reviewing propaganda or to identify what type of group would be 
targeting a particular type of facility.  Brown and Smith broke terrorists groups into 
4 types of group motivations: 
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• Religious: Their ideology or religion is more important than anything else 
to include their own lives. Their motivation is to eliminate those who are 
non-believers or those who jeopardize the fundamentals of their religious 
beliefs.  They select high casualty targets (more than 200 people), 
symbolic targets that have an economic impact and targets that 
demonstrate weakness of the enemy i.e. military or government targets.  
Examples would be Al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo.   
• Poli ical:  These groups want change in government.  There are 2 types of 
political groups. Right wing: The Militia or Patriot groups who want a more 
conservative government.  Left Wing: Communist, Marxist, Socialists 
groups who want a more liberal government.  They both focus on 
government targets.  Federal, State and Local government sites. IRS – 
FBI.  Example groups would be the Mississippi Militia movement, the 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna-ETA) and the 
Irish Republic Army (IRA). 
t
• Social: These groups want to change the current society or create a new 
society.  In change current society there is an aspect of the population 
they don’t want in their society so they attack them wherever they find 
them within society.  The KKK and National Alliance are two examples.  
The create a new society group want  to establish borders and then drive 
out that part of the population and then create a new society within those 
borders.  Predominately they protect or attack targets within their borders.  
These borders could be neighborhoods, cities or towns, states, counties or 
countries.  An example would be Hamas whose members want a 
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Palestinian homeland.  The Republic of Texas and street gangs would 
also be in this category.  The Christian Identity Movement might also fall 
within this category but more research is needed to be sure.  
• Protectionist:  These groups want to protect things they think can’t protect 
themselves.  The other groups dehumanizes their targets while 
protectionist groups humanize what they are protecting.  Examples would 
be the Animal Liberation Front, Environmental Protection Groups such as 
the Earth Liberations Front (ELF) and Anti-abortion Groups such as the 
Army of God.  
The third area for consideration in group profiling is financial backing.  
Financial backing is one of the key areas of consideration when the group is 
selecting a weapon.  That is one reason why groups select the weapon before 
they select a target.  It is easier to match the target to the weapon since targets 
are many and weapons are few.  Depending on the type of weapon desired, it 
may take some time to develop or acquire.   
  The fourth area for consideration in group profiling is education.  This is 
where you identify what level of education or experience the terrorists operating 
in your area have acquired.  Education can be broken down into two levels: 
formal (technical schools, universities) and informal (prison, training camps).  
Brown tried for 3.5 years to find an anomaly that would disprove his research.  He 
researched terrorist events for an hour every day for that 3.5 years.  During this 
time, he was unable to find a single case that significantly disproved his analysis.   
 The next step in this research project was to identify if anyone was 
teaching this information using a curriculum resembling the format outlined by 
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Smith and Brown.  That curriculum also had to support the hypothesis.  Gerald 
Kinard was chosen to address this section of the research project.  Kinard is the 
President and CEO of the Law Enforcement Academic Research Network.  
L.E.A.R.N. Incorporated is a Texas based company that has been contracted to 
provide Anti-Terrorism training for the Food Safety Inspection Service Division of 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  L.E.A.R.N. took information 
gathered from Smith, Brown and other members of their team then adapted and 
developed it to provide training to professionals whose daily responsibilities are 
to be veterinarians, compliance inspectors and other individuals whose daily 
focus is far removed from the investigative abilities of a law enforcement agency.  
The USDA’s philosophy was that it would be easier to take veterinarians and train 
them what to be conscious of in their surrounding than it would be to take anti-
terrorism specialists and teach them to be veterinarians.  L.E.A.R.N. provides a 
3.5 day training course addressing three areas: vulnerability assessments, 
protective intelligence and threat management.  A document published by the 
Gilmore Commission dated December 15, 2002 wherein James S. Gilmore III, 
Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involv ng Weapons of Mass Destruction, outlines the need for a 
proactive approach to address the threat of terrorism prior to an attack taking 
place.  It is interesting to note that the USDA is responsible for one of the more 
vulnerable and largest targets in America, the food supply.  It is a potential target 
for terrorist groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front as well as from Al Qaeda 
who have stated it is a viable target.  Kinard, a veteran police investigator, 
i
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explains that not only can this training be provided to law enforcement agencies 




This research project was undertaken to determine if there was an 
effective and efficient process whereby local law enforcement agencies of varying 
sizes could use their finite resources to accurately prevent, detect, deter, disrupt 
or minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack or activity within their jurisdictions. 
Research was done that developed information and supported the hypothesis. 
There are ways for law enforcement agencies to proactively identify potential 
terrorist threats and/or activities occurring in their areas prior to a terrorist attack 
actually taking place, to identify potential terrorist targets located within their 
jurisdictions and that proactive anti-terrorism efforts can be done using the 
existing resources of law enforcement agencies with minimal additional training 
and cost.   
The research has shown that by developing an understanding of the 12 
evolutionary behaviors and the associated timeline, law enforcement agencies 
would have 16 to 24 months prior to the attack to address the threat, not less 
than 1 hour after the weapon has been moved to the target or after activation of 
the weapon.  Since those first 9 behaviors would most likely take place within a 
30 to 60 mile radius of any targets located within an agency’s jurisdiction.  What 
was needed was a way to identify how best to educate law enforcement officials 
on how to identify, locate and neutralize the threat and also to develop an 
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understanding of possible weapons that could be used.    Incorporating that with 
the understanding that a group’s location and motivation helps to identify 
potential target selection and that financial backing and education helps to 
determine a group’s potential capability helps to bring the pieces of the puzzle 
together.  Using this philosophy, an investigating law enforcement agency could 
look at a device and accurately determine a group’s profile or look at group’s 
profile and determine what type of weapon might be used or what type of target 
might be selected.  By using intelligence gathered, recognizing what step of the 
12 evolutionary behaviors a terrorist group is trying to accomplish, one could 
possibly identify where in the process the terrorists are and possibly how much 
time is left until the attack.  An example would be:  If you identify that 5,000 
pounds of fertilizer, that could be used as a component for a bomb, has been 
stolen in your area and suspicion rises that it could be terrorist related, then 
identification of potentially valuable information has been gathered.  You know 
that the terrorists are in the weapons selection stage.  That would indicate that 
they have been operating in that area for 12 to 18 months already.  This would 
leave only 4 to 6 months before the attack.  Since the fertilizer was stolen, they 
probably aren’t well funded which would be an indicator to look for thefts of other 
needed bomb components such as storage containers (55 gal drums), accelerant 
(diesel fuel), igniters and timers.  This compiled information would indicate that 
the target, the location of the theft(s) and the group are most likely all within 30 to 
60 miles of each other.  What would also be a consideration is that the group 
would have to have a location large enough to mix and store 5,000 lbs. of 
fertilizer.  Compare this information with reports of suspicious activity in that same 
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30 to 60 mile area.  This analysis might assist with target identification or suspect 
location and quite possibly the location of previous or future component thefts.  
Not to mention that since the group is not well funded, their level of experience 
may be low as well.  This might indicate the level of sophistication of the device 
which would help to analyze the type of components that might be used and the 
target which might be selected.  After identifying potential targets, threat 
management steps can be taken to prevent a vehicle that could carry a 5,000 lbs. 
bomb from being able to get close enough to be effective.  Understanding that 
this stage of the investigation is only 4 to 6 months before the attack, an 
organization might want to have already implemented a public awareness 
program that would help to identify these suspicious activities.  L.E.A.R.N. 
teaches a technique taken from the Minneapolis/ St.Paul Airport called S.C.A.N.  
It stands for See, Contact, Ask and Notify.  It’s a simple philosophy that is already 
used by police officers but could be adapted for the public and is currently being 
taught in the USDA program.   
A law enforcement agency could teach citizens groups the S.C.A.N. 
technique then monitor and track the feedback on suspicious activity and 
persons.  During Smith and Brown’s research, they administered, to government 
employees in 15 states, 759 questionnaires containing 52 items.  An analysis of 
the questionnaire revealed that the largest majority of the group only had an 
overview level understanding of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.   
When the question was asked, what is the level of terrorist threat in the 
community? 44% stated that it was improbable and or unlikely to occur.  This 
indicated that the participants who represented six professional categories did 
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not have the type of information needed.  It was also discovered that the majority 
of participants saw the role of primary responsibility for threat recognition and 
identification to fall on local law enforcement with federal law enforcement 
second and state third.  Another statistic the questionnaires revealed was that the 
group felt that Federal Buildings and Airports were the most common targets of 
terrorist attacks.  Using data compiled from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF) from 1991 to 1995, and after removing any event(s) that were not 
directly related to terrorist motivations, Brown discovered that mailboxes, 
residences, vehicles, commercial centers or businesses and open public areas 
were the top five most commonly targeted places.  Federal government buildings 
were 13th and airports/aircraft were 17th.  There is an interesting correlation to 
these findings that were compiled by Brown in 1998.  The September 11th 
attacks on the World Trade Center, although using an aircraft as a weapon, were 
executed on a commercial/business center (4th on the list) and the ensuing 
anthrax attacks were done by mail (1st).  Smith recently studied other data that 
reviewed terrorist attacks over a 20 year period that showed that although the 
numbers of attacks have decreased, the efficiency, effectiveness and the number 
of casualties has increased.  Smith identified that claims “we are winning the war 
against terrorists because the number of terrorist incidents is down” is not 
completely accurate.  The data revealed that the efficiency of the terrorists is 
getting better.  This information does identify the need for public education at 
some level.  This is definitely an area that deserves additional research and 
supports another part of the hypothesis.  If law enforcement and emergency 
preparedness agencies have to react to a terrorist event, the terrorists have won. 
22 
All the doctors, police and firefighters in the world can’t bring back those who’ve 
lost their lives as a result of a terrorist attack.  One of the subject matter experts 
interviewed for this paper was one of the first doctors in the Murrah Building after 
the explosion.  He tells that as he stood inside the building trying to walk without 
stepping on heads, hands and other limbs victims had lost during the explosion, 
there was excrement running down the walls and a young police officer digging 
through the rubble with one hand holding the upper torso of a small child in his 
other arm.  He went to the officer and asked what he was doing.  The officer said 
“I’m trying to put it back”.  It was then, he said, that he realized that all the years 
of medical school, S.W.A.T. schools and training would never bring those victims 
back to life and preparing to react to these types of events was the incorrect 
approach.  It was then he decided to dedicate his life to trying to prevent terrorism 
and not reacting to it.   
By preventing terrorism or by making it as difficult as possible for terrorists 
to facilitate activities in your area, you increase the likelihood of not having to 
respond to a terrorist incident.  By using the techniques identified in this research 
paper, agencies could develop strategies that would give them the tools to 
proactively fight terrorism on their home front without having to apply for a grant 
to purchase a pancakeometer.  The law enforcement community not only benefits 
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